Eleonora Pischedda
https://docenti.unisi.it/it/pischedda
Profile
I am a scholar of ancient history, specializing in economics, law and anthropology of the ancient world. I graduated from the University of Siena in Historical Documentation and Research (majoring in ancient history) and received my Ph.D. from the University of Pisa in Archaeology and the Sciences of Antiquity (curriculum Anthropology of the Ancient World).
I am currently a senior researcher at the University of Siena, Department of Philology and Classical and Modern Literatures. My main areas of research concern public and private economics in classical Greece, Athenian financial administration in the 4th century BCE, Athenian public spending in the military sphere, oratory following the Peloponnesian War (with emphasis on Xenophon, Isocrates and Demosthenes), Greek law (especially in relation to the commercial sphere).
Abstract
“Public speech and civil liability. Rhetors and the legal consequences of one’s words in classical Athens”
The word has enormous power, it can turn the individual’s need into nothingness, flattening everyone into a single movement. In the military sphere, even before inciting and instilling courage, it can and must persuade: a war must first be voted on and declared!
A rhetorician has the power to determine the collective destiny of a polis, taking upon himself a great moral and civic responsibility. When speaking in an assembly, the orator has before him not only citizens, but also (and above all) possible soldiers. His task is to convince the citizens to abandon their own affairs and the safety of the household in the name of a higher ideal or collective good. But if this is done in the name of personal glory, if one chooses to lie, omit crucial information and lead the city to ruin in pursuit of one’s personal interests, can one incur a formal charge?
In classical times there was the trial by εἰσαγγελία, an extraordinary procedure usually limited to cases of offences against state security. Sources concerning the nomos eisangeltikos often speak of misleading promises. One of the most important sources on this nomos is the oration of Hyperides Against Euxenippus (29, 39): one was dragged to trial if one undermined democracy (for instance by organising plots or gathering followers), if one deceitfully surrendered a city or handed over the fleet and/or the army to the enemy, if one as a public speaker did not advise the right and best things for the people. One can therefore be sued if as a public speaker undermines democracy in exchange for money. Deceptive promises to the people were considered a very serious crime and extremely dangerous for the proper functioning of the democratic process (Dem. XX.100, 135; XLIX.67). All sources agree in speaking of public speakers and false promises; moreover, it is certain that this process only affected citizens.
Determining when and how the rhetorician had committed such an offence, however, could not have been an easy task. Proving then that he had lied knowing full well that he was endangering the polis was almost impossible.
It is of considerable interest to try to understand the nature of such an offence and where the belief that the rhetorician could be called to account for his words in court stems from.
But even more interesting, perhaps, is to understand how and by what expedients the speaker could succeed in his intent by avoiding taking civil responsibility for his words.
